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Newman, J., Dissenting: 
Another Vision of the Federal Circuit
Blake Hartz*
IntroductIon
This Essay examines how, to some, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has gone 
astray. While the wisdom of various aspects of the Federal Circuit has been questioned 
in recent years by commentators,1 relatively little attention has been paid to some of the 
most common and constant criticism: the dissenting opinions of Judge Pauline Newman.2 
Examining the dissenting opinions of Judge Newman provides an alternative viewpoint 
of the Federal Circuit and how it has (at least according to one) erred. Part I discusses 
the reasons for selecting Judge Newman for the leading role. Part II examines the role of 
dissenting opinions in general and in particular at the Federal Circuit. Part III provides an 
empirical overview of Judge Newman’s prodigious collection of dissents before addressing 
some doctrinal areas where her view of the law departs from that of the larger body of 
Federal Circuit judges. Part IV describes how Judge Newman’s dissenting jurisprudence 
may be reinvoked in the future at the Federal Circuit.
I. A centrAl FIgure In FederAl cIrcuIt dIAlogues
Before joining the court, Judge Newman had thirty years of experience as a chemist and 
patent lawyer at FMC Corporation.3 Her involvement in the American Chemical Society 
included committee work on patents and related legislation.4 She served on a domestic 
* J.D., Indiana University Maurer School of Law. Thanks to Mark Janis for many opportunities.
1.  See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 1619 (2007).
2.  But see W. Stanfield Johnson, The Federal Circuit’s Great Dissenter and Her “National Policy of 
Fairness to Contractors”, 40 PUb. CoNt. L.J. 275 (2011) (analyzing two decades of Judge Newman’s dissents in 
government contracts cases). Judge Newman’s disagreements with particular judges have also been examined. E.g., 
Dennis Crouch, Dissents: Judges Newman and Dyk, PateNtLy-o (Sept. 23, 2011, 4:42 PM), http://www.patentlyo.
com/patent/2011/09/dissents-judges-newman-and-dyk.html (reporting Judges Newman and Dyk disagreed on over 
75% of precedential patent cases in an eighteen-month period in which they were both involved). 
3.  See MaRioN t. beNNett, the UNited StateS CoURt of aPPeaLS foR the fedeRaL CiRCUit: a hiStoRy 1990-
2002, at 25-26 (2004).
4.  Id. at 26. 
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policy review committee convened by President Carter starting in 1978,5 and continued to 
be an influential industry voice in the creation of the Federal Circuit.6
 Not only is Judge Newman one of the central figures in the creation of the Federal 
Circuit, but she also frequently disagrees with her colleagues.7 As the first judge appointed 
directly to the Federal Circuit, and now entering her twenty-ninth year on the court,8 she is 
associated with some 369 dissenting opinions.9 Compare this with the 892 opinions for the court 
she has written in the same time.10 Judge Newman dissents more than anyone else on the court.11
Judge Newman is unreserved about expressing her departures from the majority of the 
court. Additionally, she admits that her opinions are influenced by her experience with 
the patent system before the Federal Circuit: “Although I’ve occasionally criticized our 
treatment of the law, I never forget why we were formed, or the state of the patent law 
5.  Pauline Newman, Origins of the Federal Circuit: The Role of Industry, 11 fed. CiR. b.J. 541, 541-42 
(2002).
6.  See fRaNk P. CihLaR, the CoURt aMeRiCaN bUSiNeSS waNted aNd Got: the UNited StateS CoURt of 
aPPeaLS foR the fedeRaL CiRCUit 9-10 (1982) (“What is clear, however, is that the CAFC would have suffered 
such a fate [died in committee like previous proposals] without the efforts of a handful of people, including . 
. . Pauline Newman of FMC Corporation . . .”); Newman, supra note 5, at 543 (noting that in Congressional 
testimony Newman represented over 107 industry groups, businesses, and universities);.
7.  See Gregory A. Castanias et al., 2010 Patent Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit: The Advent of “The 
Rader Court”, 60 aM. U. L. Rev. 845, 1052 Table 1 (2011) (reporting Newman wrote greatest number of 
separate opinions in patent cases in 2010, and that nearly half of the patent opinions she authored generated 
separate opinions by other judges); Dennis Crouch, Dissenting Opinions at the Federal Circuit, PateNtLy-o 
(Sept. 2, 2012, 11:44 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/09/dissenting-opinions-at-the-federal-
circuit.html. 
8.  Judge Newman was appointed to the court in 1984. Pauline Newman, Circuit Judge, U.S. Ct. aPP. foR the 
fed. CiR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/pauline-newman-circuit-judge.html. 
9.  As of April 13, 2012. Using the CTAF database on Westlaw, I searched for “DIS(newman)”. The 
“DIS(NAME)” query actually reports any occurrence of NAME anywhere in the dissent, so it picks up the 
names of judges joining in the dissent written by another, as well as case citations including “(NAME, J., 
[dissenting/concurring])”. While this limits the accuracy of some of the empirical results in this Essay, it 
provides some metric of dissension.
10.  As of April 13, 2012. Using the CTAF database on Westlaw, I searched for “JU(newman)”.
11.  I performed searches for the other active judges similar to that described above. See supra notes 9 and 10. 
These results are summarized in Table 3 infra. Judge Newman is certainly an outlier with respect to the total 
number of dissents produced, but less so given her length of service. The most recent group of appointees 
appears to be writing a greater number of dissents as a percentage of their overall opinion writing. However, 
these results are skewed by several recent denials of petitions for rehearing en banc, which confuses the way 
Westlaw tags who the opinion authors are. See supra note 9. For example, Judge Wallach is counted as having 
two dissents and no majority opinions. But his two “dissents” are actually recorded for cases where he joins 
the opinion of another judge dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, 
LLP, 676 F.3d 1024 (Fed. Cir. 2012), and Marine Polymer Techs., Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., 672 F.3d 1350 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012). See also, e.g., Gregory A. Castanias et al., Survey of the Federal Circuit’s Patent Law Decisions 
in 2006: A New Chapter in the Ongoing Dialogue with the Supreme Court, 56 aM. U. L. Rev. 793, 978 tbl.2 
(2007) (reporting Newman wrote half of all dissents in patent cases in 2006). 
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before we arrived.”12 If there is a “dialogue” about, among, or between the Federal Circuit 
and anyone else, Judge Newman is one of the discernible voices.  
II. dIssentIng opInIons And the FederAl cIrcuIt
 A. Functions of Dissent
 Some judges criticize the proliferation of dissents. Judge Posner claims “[m]ost 
judges do not like to dissent” for a variety of reasons, including the perception that writing a 
dissent increases the significance of the majority opinion.13 Moreover, writing dissents frays 
the collegiality that is central to small-group appellate decision-making.14 Commentators 
have long recognized that dissents undermine public confidence in the judicial system 
because they “reveal[] the amateurish uncertainty of the judicial mind.”15 Even Justice 
Holmes, himself a great dissenter, called dissents “useless” and “undesirable” (in a 
dissenting opinion, of course).16
 But dissenting opinions serve important purposes. They can be prophetic, “point[ing] 
the way to our future, showing us what we and our government can and should become.”17 
Dissents can be specifically written to trigger further review by the Supreme Court,18 the 
en banc court,19 or the legislature.20 They can improve the majority opinion and keep the 
majority’s characterization of the record honest.21 Dissents also communicate to the losing 
party that their arguments were heard,22 alleviating some of the public confidence problems 
that might otherwise be created by appearing to undermine the majority.
12.  Newman, supra note 5, at 541; see also Judge Pauline Newman, After Twenty-Five Years, 17 fed. CiR. 
b.J. 123, 123 (2007) (“It is time, again, to think creatively, to assure that the law and the policy it implements 
are optimum for today’s and tomorrow’s science and its technologic applications.”).
13.  RiChaRd a. PoSNeR, how JUdGeS thiNk 32 (2008).
14.  See id. at 32-34. The theory of “dissent aversion” has been documented in some academic studies. E.g., 
Stefanie A. Lindquist, Bureaucratization and Balkanization: The Origins and Effects of Decision-Making 
Norms in the Federal Appellate Courts, 41 U. RiCh. L. Rev. 659, 694-96 & tbl.5 (2007). Judge Posner says 
this result is expected, because on a larger court, the dissenting judge will not be on the same panel with the 
majority as often, and therefore have less incentive to be nice. See PoSNeR, supra note 13, at 32 n.30; see also 
Alex Kozinski & James Burnham, I Say Dissental, You Say Concurral, 121 yaLe L.J. oNLiNe 601, 609-10 
(2012) (noting growth of en banc activity as courts have grown and generated more “outlier panels”).
15.  William A. Bowen, Dissenting Opinions, 17 GReeN baG 690, 693 (1905).
16.  N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
17.  William A. Fletcher, Dissent, 39 GoLdeN Gate U. L. Rev. 291, 295 (2009). Justice Brennan described 
these “prophetic” dissents as those that “soar with passion and ring with rhetoric” and “at their best, straddle 
the worlds of literature and law.” William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 haStiNGS L.J. 427, 431 
(1986).
18.  E.g., Evan A. Evans, The Dissenting Opinion—Its Use and Abuse, 3 Mo. L. Rev. 120, 131 (1938).
19.  Fletcher, supra note 17, at 296, 299-300. 
20.  Id. at 299.
21.  Id. at 297-98.
22.  Id. at 298-99.
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 B. Dissenting Opinions in the Federal Circuit
The Federal Circuit has jurisdictional peculiarities that raise the stakes for dissenting 
opinions. For its subject matter jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit is the exclusive appellate 
forum.23 Among other things, this prevents the creation of “circuit splits” that form the basis 
of many petitions for certiorari and trigger the involvement of the Supreme Court.24 While 
there has been a recent uptick in the number of Federal Circuit cases decided by the Supreme 
Court, the lack of a jurisprudential “conversation” between the Federal Circuit and both 
the sister Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court has been noted throughout the Federal 
Circuit’s history.25 The ABA’s opposition to the creation of the Federal Circuit originally 
was due, in part, to this lack of a “percolation” of issues with the other circuits.26 Indeed, 
some judges of the Federal Circuit have complained about a lack of competing voices.27 
Judge Newman, however, maintains that “because the Federal Circuit itself airs divergent 
viewpoints in important cases,” issues “that may warrant further judicial or legislative 
consideration” receive sufficient attention.28 In the words of one commentator, “[o]ne thing 
the Federal Circuit has learned to do is to write dissents that attract Supreme Court review.”29
 Like the other federal appellate courts, panel opinions of the Federal Circuit are 
binding on future panels unless an en banc ruling (or a Supreme Court decision) intervenes 
and changes the law.30 Although the court has a practice of circulating opinions to the 
23.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(c), (d), 1295 (2006) (referring to “exclusive” jurisdiction). Determining whether 
something falls within the “arising under” jurisdiction of the statutes listed in § 1295 is governed by the well-
pleaded complaint rule. Christianson v. Colt Indus., 486 U.S. 800 (1988). For certain administrative actions, 
parties can seek review or redetermination, depending on the context, at the district court level before that 
same subject would be appealable to the Federal Circuit. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 145. 
24.  Nard & Duffy, supra note 1, at 1623-24.
25.  See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. iLL. L. Rev. 387, 389.
26.  Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit—A Reminiscence, 14 Geo. MaSoN L. Rev. 513, 516-17 (1992).
27.  See Randall R. Rader, The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: The Promise and Perils 
of a Court of Limited Jurisdiction, 5 MaRq. iNteLL. PRoP. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2001); see also Nard & Duffy, supra 
note 1, at 1622-24 (describing statements by Judges Michel and Rader).
28.  Judge Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit in Perspective, 54 aM. U. L. Rev. 821, 823 (2005) 
(responding to arguments raised by the ABA litigation section in opposition to the creation of the Federal 
Circuit); see also id. at 826 (“With close questions, diversity of judicial viewpoint is more frequent. Such 
diversity produces the ‘percolation’ that scholars feared would be lost to the Federal Circuit, and indeed can 
lead to consensus strengthened by the deliberations in reaching it.”); Pauline Newman, The Sixth Abraham 
L. Pomerantz Lecture: Commentary on the Paper by Professor Dreyfuss, 61 bRook. L. Rev. 53, 62 (1995) 
(claiming the concern over lack of Supreme Court attention due to insufficient intercircuit conflict “has not 
been borne out in practice”).
29.  Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit as an Institution: What Ought We to Expect?, 43 Loy. 
L.a. L. Rev. 827, 840 (2010) (collecting cases).
30.  E.g., Federal Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 13 ¶1. Problems of relative youth (and lack of 
precedent) of the Federal Circuit are at least partially ameliorated by the incorporation of Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals and Court of Claims cases as binding precedent. See S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 
1368 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
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chambers of all active judges before publication,31 this rarely results in hearing issues en 
banc.32 The rate at which cases are decided en banc at the Federal Circuit is among the 
lowest of the Courts of Appeals.33 Despite this, dissent from denial of rehearing en banc can 
be important to changing the law34 and its practice35 at the Federal Circuit. 
III. newmAn, J., dIssentIng
 A. By the Numbers
  1. Statistical Overview of Judge Newman’s Dissent Writing
Table 2 in the Appendix shows how Judge Newman’s dissent and majority opinion writing 
has varied over time. Although there is quite a bit of variation, Judge Newman’s rate of 
dissent, as measured against the number of majority opinions she has authored in a given year 
and illustrated in Figure 1, below, has generally increased with her length of service on the 
court.36 Figure 2 presents the same information, but calculated against the total of majority, 
dissenting, and concurring opinions.37 The dissent rate, when simply compared to the number 
of opinions authored (calculated as either majority plus dissent or majority, concurrence, and 
dissent), increases by about 1% each year. However, if we account for the growing caseload of 
the court, including the growing number of panels Judge Newman has sat on, trends are less 
pronounced, as illustrated in Figure 3.38 That rate of increase is less than 0.3% per year.
31.  Federal Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 10 ¶5. 
32.  Christopher A. Cotropia, Determining Uniformity Within the Federal Circuit by Measuring Dissent and 
En Banc Review, 43 Loy. L.a. L. Rev. 801, 817 (2010) (reporting en banc rate of the Federal Circuit as 0.18% 
of all cases over period of study).
33.  Id. 
34.  See, e.g., Kozinski & Burnham, supra note 14, at 607-08. Kozinski and Burnham call a dissent from 
denial of rehearing en banc a “dissental”. Id. at 601. Among other redeeming functions of dissentals, they 
identify use of dissentals in later cases by the Supreme Court. Id. at 608 (citing Chickasaw Nation v. United 
States, 534 U.S. 84, 91 (2001) (citing Little Six, Inc. v. United States, 229 F.3d 1383, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(Dyk, J., dissental))).
35.  Id. at 608 (citing the use of Judge Newman’s dissental in Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 
F.2d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1992), in a reference book to explain why patent prosecutors should avoid product-by-
process claims).
36.  See infra fig.1. The slope of the best-fit line is 0.0107, meaning the rate increases over 1% per year. I have 
omitted concurrences from this figure. The tendency to increase the frequency of dissent with time on a court is 
not unique to Judge Newman. See Brennan, supra note 17, at 427 (noting that Justice Brennan dissented zero 
times in sixteen opinions his first term, but dissented forty-two times out of fifty-six in the October 1984 term).
37.  Westlaw counts a concurrence-in-part, dissent-in-part as both a concurrence and a dissent. Thus, D/
(D+M+C) may undercount because the denominator contains multiples. However, simply counting dissents 
may overcount, since dis(JUDGE) will pick up things like “(JUDGE, J., dissenting)” in a citation and “with 
whom JUDGE, Circuit Judge, concurs” in the dissenting opinion. Concurrences are potentially overcounted 
in this way, too. I’ve tried to provide a mixture of different counting/trending techniques to ensure that the 
overall conclusions are sound.
38.  See infra fig.3. The slope of the best-fit line is 0.0027.
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Figure 1: Percentage of Opinions Dissenting Over Time
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Figure 2: Percentage of Opinions Dissenting Over Time (including Concurrences)
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Figure 3: Dissent Rate Per Panel Compared to Per Opinion
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The overall numbers reinforce the perception that Judge Newman dissents frequently. She 
has dissented in more than 7% of the cases she has been involved in while writing majority 
opinions in only 17% of them.39 Comparing Judge Newman to (most of) the other members 
of the court is also illustrative of her prodigious dissenting rates. Table 3 in the Appendix 
compiles these results. Of the current court, she has one of the lowest writing rates for majority 
opinions (discounting the three most recent appointees), and simultaneously the highest 
writing rate for dissenting opinions. Of the former judges, only Judge Davis, dissenting in 
5.6% of the cases he appeared in, is comparable to Judge Newman’s 7.1% dissent rate. By 
comparison, some of the other former active judges of the court have extremely low dissent 
rates: Rich, less than 0.6%; Markey, 1.1%; Clevenger, 1%; Archer, 1%; Michel, 1.1%. 
However measured, Judge Newman is responsible for much of the dissent on the court, 
past and present. Christopher Cotropia reports 538 dissenting opinions in Federal Circuit 
cases in fiscal years 1998-2009.40 By my count, about 35% of those dissents (191) are from 
Judge Newman.41 Cotropia also notes that 325 of the dissents in his study are patent 
cases, and the rate of dissent (compared to total number of opinions) is almost three times 
greater in patent cases.42 Applying the same methodology as Cotropia, Judge Newman is 
39.  See infra tbl.2. 
40.  Cotropia, supra note 32, at 815 tbl.1. Cotropia’s numbers include all opinions and orders, regardless of 
publication or precedential status. See id. at 811.
41.  See infra tbl.2. However, the search technique is imperfect, and captures things like “with whom 
NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, joins, dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc” and citations including 
“Newman, J.” in dissenting opinions. Nonetheless, it provides some proxy. 
42.  Cotropia, supra note 32, at 816 tbl.2. Cotropia defined “patent case” broadly to include “any case involving 
a patent law issue, no matter how tangential that issue was to the main issues.” Id. at 813. He achieved this by 
simply structuring the Westlaw query like this: op(patent!) dis(patent!) & da(aft 9/30/1997 & bef 10/1/2009). 
See id. at 813 n.70. This method labels any case that includes the word “patent” as a “patent case”. 
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involved in 112 (34%) of the dissents in patent cases over the relevant period.43 Over her 
entire career, Judge Newman has dissented in over 15% of the patent cases in which she 
appeared on the panel, more than twice her overall rate, while writing majority opinions 
in 29% of patent cases she hears, which is also substantially more than her overall writing 
rate.44
  2. Recent Trends in Judge Newman’s Dissents
Examining the most recent dissents in depth provides additional insights into current 
differences in opinion. Seventy-four opinions, starting in fiscal year 2009 to April 2012, 
were categorized based on subject matter jurisdiction and the type of issue dissented from. 
The study included all opinions in which Judge Newman authored or joined in a dissent. 
Applications of the broad labels of “jurisdictional,” “procedural,” and “substantive” to the 
type of issue the dissent focuses on is imperfect and somewhat subjective, but nonetheless 
provides some insight into the variety of decisions involved. Table 1 below summarizes the 
results from the study.
Table 1: Judge Newman Dissents by Subject Matter, FY2009 to April 2012 
Subject Matter Jurisdictional Procedural Substantive Total of Row
Antidumping 0 0 2 2
Claim45 1 1 6 8
Contract 2 1 5 8
Customs 0 0 2 2
Employee Benefits 1 1 5 7
Patent 3 11 23 37
Taking 0 0 2 2
Trademark 1 0 3 4
Vaccine 0 0 1 1
Veterans 0 3 0 3
Total of Column 8 17 49 74
 A few points about Table 1 stand out. First, in accordance with the overall trend 
of higher dissent rates in patent cases described in the previous section, Judge Newman’s 
43.  My query: dis(newman) & da(aft 9/30/1997 & bef 10/1/2009) & (op(patent!) dis(patent!)). 
44.  Using the query techniques described supra notes 42-43, Judge Newman has, in patent cases over her 
entire career, 1324 panels, 207 dissents, 393 majority opinions, 103 concurrences, and 58 opinions concurring-
in-part and dissenting-in-part. 
45.  This includes all claims that weren’t a government contract or a taking, such as tax refunds, judicial 
compensation, and various other claims against administrative agencies.
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dissents over the past three years are weighted heavily towards patent cases. Notably, half 
of her dissents over the period are in patent cases; issues of claim construction, obviousness, 
contract interpretation accounted for twelve of these, while no other specific issue garnered 
more than two. Second, disagreements about jurisdiction, which would ideally be a well-
defined area, are relatively frequent. 
 B. By the Words 
 Although Judge Newman’s dissents are too numerous to comprehensively discuss, a 
few highlights of common themes show differences of opinion about the role of the Federal 
Circuit and the law it produces. 
  1. Fact/Law Distinction and Appellate Review
Judge Newman has repeatedly criticized the rest of the court for turning questions 
that appear to be factual into legal issues that can be decided by the court. Her 
dissent in Markman I is perhaps the most prominent example. There, she examines 
many definitions of what it means for an issue to be “fact” and finds that defining 
“inventory” is a “fact” under all of them.46 She argues claim construction as a matter of 
law “distorts the trial/appellate relationship” and “manifests a heady misperception of 
our assignment as a national appellate court.”47 Even if the legal effect of a claim is a 
legal issue, it is premised on underlying facts that should not be reclassified as “law.”48 
Furthermore, she notes, that labeling factual inquiries as legal inquiries may conflict 
with Seventh Amendment jury trial rights.49 Obviously, the Supreme Court disagreed 
with some of these conclusions in Markman II.50  Nonetheless, Judge Newman had 
raised many of the same issues well before Markman,51 and the debate over the claim 
construction fact/law matters and how to review the “mongrel” practice rages on.52 
Surprisingly, in one of the more recent cases to approach the claim construction review 
standard issue, Judge Newman did not write separately from the denial of rehearing en 
banc.53 
46.  Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 1008-10 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Newman, J., 
dissenting).
47.  Id. at 1008.
48.  See id. at 1000.
49.  E.g., id. at 1000, 1010-17.
50.  Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
51.  See Senmed, Inc. v. Richard-Allan Med. Indus., Inc., 888 F.2d 815, 821-26 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (Newman, J., 
dissenting).
52.  E.g., Amgen Inc. v. Hoescht Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (generating six separate 
opinions regarding the denial of rehearing en banc); see also id. at 1043 (Newman, J., dissenting from denial 
of rehearing en banc) (urging all scientific and technological facts be reviewed under the same standards and 
calling for the standard of review in claim construction to be reopened).  
53.  Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2011). cert. denied, ___ S. 
Ct. ___, 2013 WL 57105 (2013).
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But the broader issue of fact/law classification and the role of appellate courts remains 
a lingering issue. One example is the Festo case. On the final remand from the Supreme 
Court, Judge Newman criticizes the majority for “converting two of the Court’s three 
rebuttal criteria into questions of law and then deciding them, sua sponte, without trial 
or record.”54 She also dissented in Lough v. Brunswick Corp., stating that experimental 
use should remain classified as a question of fact.55 Similarly, in a recent contracts case, 
she dissents because “[t]he panel majority now redesignates some critical findings of 
fact as rulings of law. . .”56 Judge Newman’s dissents also continue to criticize the court 
for finding new facts on appeal.57 She has also recently dissented on the grounds that a 
panel majority opinion was a new rejection that a patent applicant had had no opportunity 
to respond to.58 Additionally, Judge Newman has expressed concerns about different 
standards of review and the relationship of the court to Patent & Trademark Office.59 
Together, these opinions show a lasting disagreement about the role of the Federal Circuit 
as an appellate court. 
  2. Takings
 Judge Newman’s view of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause is more expansive 
than those of some of her colleagues. Just last year, in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission, 
she dissented from the panel and denial of rehearing en banc decisions, criticizing the 
majority for finding that a repeated temporary flooding could not be a taking.60 The Supreme 
Court reversed in late 2012.61 Similarly, the Zoltek Corp. case illustrates a division at the 
Federal Circuit over whether patent infringement is cognizable as a taking or merely as 
54.  Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyu Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55.  103 F.3d 1517, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Newman, J., dissenting).
56.  Mabus v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 633 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman, J., 
dissenting).
57.  See Gen. Protecht Grp., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 619 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Newman, 
J., dissenting) (“This court now finds its own facts, applies theories that were not raised by any party, 
uses incorrect standards of review, and creates its own electrical technology contrary to the uniform and 
unchallenged expert testimony.”); id. at 1319 (“[T]he court’s contrary finding is totally devoid of support.”); 
see also Shum v. Intel Corp., 633 F.3d 1067 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“That a jury is 
deadlocked does not convert fact into law, and the constitutional right is not negated when the jury is 
deadlocked.”); Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 77 F.3d 450, 456 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Newman, J., 
dissenting) (“It is inappropriate for the appellate court to make its own scientific finding that such proof is not 
possible on the court’s new criterion.”).
58.  In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman, J., dissenting).
59.  In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 698 F.3d 1349, 1351-55 (Fed. Cir. 2012)  (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc); Flo Healthcare Solutions, LLC v. Kappos, 697 F.3d 1367, (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Newman, J., 
additional views).
60.  Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 648 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 637 F.3d 1366, 
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman, J., dissenting).
61.  Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, No. 11-597, 568 U.S. ___ (U.S. Dec. 4, 2012).
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a tort that cannot be brought in the Court of Federal Claims.62 Judge Newman has also 
disputed the timing of when a taking occurs,63 as well as the possessory rights of Native 
Americans that would give rise to a takings claim.64
IV. Judge newmAn’s dIssents And FederAl cIrcuIt AdVocAcy 
What do Judge Newman’s dissents tell us about the Federal Circuit? Even if there is 
significant conflict at the court, the likelihood of invoking the en banc court is small.65 
To the extent that Federal Circuit en banc practice can be analogized to Supreme 
Court petitions for certiorari, the framing and presentation of the case similarly takes 
on paramount importance.66 This may be especially important because of the recent 
generational turnover at the Federal Circuit: with three judges with less than two years of 
experience (and three additional seats currently vacant), it is possible that the newest crop 
of judges is less set in their ways and more open to the minority viewpoints expressed 
in the past. If the statistics for Judges O’Malley and Reyna indicate that these judges 
are willing to depart from their current colleagues,67 they may be more willing to depart 
from precedent and consider dissents of the past. The importance of dissents in changing 
the law at the Federal Circuit may be even greater than in other circuits given the 
Federal Circuit’s tendency to rely on its own cases and develop a specialized law that is 
“substantially out of the mainstream.”68
62.  Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 464 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 
F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (containing two differently reasoned concurrences and a dissent), 
vacated, 672 F.3d 1309, 1317-18 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc in part).
63.  Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J., dissenting) (insisting that 
a notice of intent to convert a railway into a trail did not constitute a taking (and set a statute of limitations 
running) because the reversionary interest was not yet terminated, while her colleagues disagreed); Caldwell v. 
United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Newman, J., dissenting) (same); see also John R. Sand & 
Gravel Co. v. United States, 457 F.3d 1345, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (similar, involving restrictions on gravel pit 
based on nearby landfill).
64.  Bay View, Inc. v. United States, 278 F.3d 1259, 1266-68 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Newman, J., dissenting) 
(finding interest in full amount of proceeds of timber sales); Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. Ammon, 209 F.3d 1366, 
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Newman, J., dissenting) (finding sufficient interest to support a takings claim, contrary 
to the majority).
65.  Cotropia, supra note 32.
66.  Dreyfuss, supra note 29, at 834 (“[T]he large number of debates among the Federal Circuit judges, 
coupled with the low rate of en banc review, suggests that the judges are continually in conflict but fail to 
frame their disagreements in ways that make en banc review fruitful enough to identify optimal rules on which 
to converge.”).
67.  See infra tbl.3 (reporting Judges O’Malley and Reyna dissent in 35% and 57% of their filed opinions so far, 
respectively); see also Harold C. Wegner, New Judges on the Federal Circuit, iP fRoNtLiNe, (Apr. 21, 2012), 
http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.aspx?id=26834&deptid=7 (collecting citations for Judge Reyna).
68.  See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23 
beRkeLey teCh. L.J. 787, 804 & n.84 (2008); see also, e.g., Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC, 625 F.3d 
1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Newman, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for creating special standing rule 
when subject of a commercial sale is a patent).
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 Judge Newman’s dissents may be instructive on particular doctrinal problems as 
well. Takings cases may be a particularly interesting doctrine to watch. The recent Arkansas 
Game & Fish Commission case at the Supreme Court is notable. While the Federal Circuit 
has had several affirmances in recent years, odds favor reversal once certiorari has been 
granted.69 Judge Newman’s opinion in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission relied heavily 
on Supreme Court cases, and is structurally similar to her opinion in Bilski70 that was in 
some ways vindicated.71 Arkansas Game & Fish Commission had a similar outcome. While 
the Supreme Court did not rule that a taking occurred, instead deciding the case on the 
narrower grounds that the Federal Circuit erred in providing an automatic exemption from 
normal takings doctrine for temporary floods,72 the decision supports Judge Newman’s 
approach.73 It seems plausible that Judge Newman’s other disagreements about the proper 
application of takings law, including the existence of sufficient property interests and timing 
and accrual of takings claims, will be more influential in the range of takings cases that 
come before the Federal Circuit. 
conclusIon
 Judge Newman’s dissents provide an alternative vision of the Federal Circuit, 
both structurally74 and doctrinally.75 While the influence of any one dissenting opinion at 
the court is unknown, Judge Newman’s dissents provide divergent, reasoned viewpoints 
on a broad range of topics. As society, law, and court personnel shift over time, Judge 
Newman’s contrapuntal collection remains (and grows!), waiting to be discovered by a more 
appreciative audience.  
69.  See, e.g., Circuit Scorecard, SCotUSbLoG, http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/
SB_scorecard_OT11_final.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2012) (reporting reversals in 63% of October Term 2011 
cases).
70.  In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing the machine-or-
transformation test is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent).
71.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010) (rejecting machine-or-transformation as sole test).
72.  Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, No. 11-597, 568 U.S. ___, slip op. at 13 (U.S. Dec. 4, 2012).
73.  Compare id. at 7-8, with Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 637 F.3d 1366, 1381-82 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
74.  E.g., Johnson, supra note 2, at 276, 346 (concluding that Judge Newman’s dissents “declare a responsible, 
nonpartisan view that the Federal Circuit has inappropriately moved the balance of its government contract 
jurisprudence toward protecting the sovereign and the public fisc” and “speak for a frustrated national 
conscience”).
75.  See Mark Rambler, The Faces of the Federal Circuit; A Look at the Judges that Make U.S. Patent Law, 
ReCoRdeR (S.F.), Mar. 22, 1999, at 5 (quoting Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss describing Judge Newman as “the 
most broad-minded” and “willing to think more about interdisciplinary ideas”).
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AppendIx
Table 2: Dissent Rates of Judge Newman76
Fiscal 
Year77
D78 M79 C80 P81 D/(D+M) D/(D+M+C) (D/P) (D+M)/P M/P
1985 2 19 2 67 0.095 0.087 0.030 0.313 0.284
1986 4 28 6 84 0.125 0.105 0.048 0.381 0.333
1987 8 27 4 128 0.229 0.205 0.063 0.273 0.211
1988 9 31 9 173 0.225 0.184 0.052 0.231 0.179
1989 11 31 5 195 0.262 0.234 0.056 0.215 0.159
1990 7 23 4 145 0.233 0.206 0.048 0.207 0.159
1991 10 16 3 177 0.385 0.345 0.056 0.147 0.090
1992 6 31 1 199 0.162 0.158 0.030 0.186 0.156
1993 9 28 6 213 0.243 0.209 0.042 0.174 0.131
1994 12 34 5 211 0.261 0.235 0.057 0.218 0.161
1995 11 39 6 260 0.220 0.196 0.042 0.192 0.150
1996 14 45 6 201 0.237 0.215 0.070 0.294 0.224
1997 16 45 6 210 0.262 0.239 0.076 0.290 0.214
1998 12 43 6 212 0.218 0.197 0.057 0.259 0.203
1999 13 40 2 200 0.245 0.236 0.065 0.265 0.200
2000 8 43 4 224 0.157 0.145 0.036 0.228 0.192
2001 9 57 2 222 0.136 0.132 0.041 0.297 0.257
2002 19 31 4 196 0.380 0.352 0.097 0.255 0.158
76.  This table includes all opinions and orders, regardless of publication and precedential status. The dates are 
based on fiscal years (October 1 to September 30), in order to compare against the results reported in Cotropia, 
supra note 32.
77.  1984 is omitted because Judge Newman authored no majority and no dissenting opinions in her first few 
months on the bench. She did sit on four panels for opinions issued in 1984; that fact is accounted for in total 
results for the per panel statistics.
78.  Number of dissenting opinions, sample Westlaw query for the 2011 results: dis(newman) & da(aft 
9/30/2010 & bef 10/1/2011).
79.  Number of majority opinions, sample Westlaw query for the 2011 results: ju(newman) & da(aft 9/30/2010 
& bef 10/1/2011). 
80.  Number of concurring opinions, sample Westlaw query for the 2011 results: con(newman) & da(aft 
9/30/2010 & bef 10/1/2011).
81.  Number of panels sat on, sample Westlaw query for the 2011 results: pa(newman) & da(aft 9/30/2010 & 
bef 10/1/2011).
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2003 20 31 8 198 0.392 0.339 0.101 0.258 0.157
2004 19 28 5 194 0.404 0.365 0.098 0.242 0.144
2005 20 38 5 201 0.345 0.317 0.100 0.289 0.189
2006 18 35 3 235 0.340 0.321 0.077 0.226 0.149
2007 22 32 6 184 0.407 0.367 0.120 0.293 0.174
2008 12 34 3 175 0.261 0.245 0.069 0.263 0.194
2009 19 28 9 196 0.404 0.339 0.097 0.240 0.143
2010 24 25 9 183 0.490 0.414 0.131 0.268 0.137
2011 24 18 4 201 0.571 0.522 0.119 0.209 0.090
201282 11 12 4 115 0.478 0.407 0.096 0.200 0.104
TOTAL 369 892 137 5203 0.293 0.264 0.071 0.242 0.171
Table 3: Dissent Rates at the Federal Circuit83
Judge84 D85 M86 P87 Years 
Active88
D/Y D/(D+M) D/P (D+M)/P M/P
Active Judges
Newman 369 892 5203 28.12 13.12 0.293 0.071 0.242 0.171
Lourie 70 981 4881 22.02 3.18 0.067 0.014 0.215 0.201
Rader 87 1079 5188 21.68 4.01 0.075 0.017 0.225 0.208
Bryson 52 720 3752 17.54 2.96 0.067 0.014 0.206 0.192
Linn 44 452 2658 12.40 3.55 0.089 0.017 0.187 0.170
Dyk 108 474 2300 11.89 9.09 0.186 0.047 0.253 0.206
Prost 39 411 2558 10.55 3.70 0.087 0.015 0.176 0.161
Moore 24 149 1144 5.60 4.29 0.139 0.021 0.151 0.130
82.  Ending 4/13/2012, the day the searches were conducted.
83.  I followed the methodology of Cotropia, supra note 32, using simple Westlaw searches similar to those 
laid out supra notes 76-79. 
84.  I’m only including (A) active judges; and (B) senior and past judges with at least five years of active 
Federal Circuit service. The search dates for the senior and past judges eliminate any Court of Claims or Court 
of Customs and Patent Appeals cases and any decisions while on senior status.
85.  Number of dissenting opinions, based on Westlaw query: dis(NAME)&da(aft START & bef END).
86.  Number of majority opinions, based on Westlaw query: ju(NAME)&da(aft START & bef END).
87.  Number of panels sat on, based on Westlaw query: pa(NAME)&da(aft START & bef END).
88.  This is calculated based on the difference between date the searches were conducted (4/13/2012) or the 
date the judge retired, died, or took senior status, whichever is earlier, and the date on which each judge joined 
the Federal Circuit. 
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O’Malley 14 26 225 1.30 10.81 0.350 0.062 0.178 0.116
Reyna 12 9 196 1.02 11.72 0.571 0.061 0.107 0.046
Wallach 2 0 33 0.40 4.97 1.000 0.061 0.061 0.000
Senior and Past Judges
Mayer 139 604 4646 23.04 6.03 0.187 0.030 0.160 0.130
Plager 54 443 2845 21.05 2.57 0.109 0.019 0.175 0.156
Clevenger 32 622 3216 15.76 2.03 0.049 0.010 0.203 0.193
Schall 42 765 3619 17.13 2.45 0.052 0.012 0.223 0.211
Gajarsa 70 509 2942 13.88 5.04 0.121 0.024 0.197 0.173
Rich 16 563 2659 16.79 0.95 0.028 0.006 0.218 0.212
Davis 33 168 593 5.80 5.69 0.164 0.056 0.339 0.283
Markey 13 264 1223 8.66 1.50 0.047 0.011 0.226 0.216
Miller 18 203 790 7.17 2.51 0.081 0.023 0.280 0.257
Friedman 28 131 694 6.75 4.15 0.176 0.040 0.229 0.189
Nies 68 360 1775 13.17 5.16 0.159 0.038 0.241 0.203
Bissell 20 179 724 5.65 3.54 0.101 0.028 0.275 0.247
Archer 24 544 2332 12.02 2.00 0.042 0.010 0.244 0.233
Michel 50 878 4505 22.24 2.25 0.054 0.011 0.206 0.195
